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Introduction 
The paper provides an economic analysis of two types of counterfeit goods under 
market equilibrium and under market failure respectively.  Section one answers why 
consumers demand fake goods, the counterfeiters’ incentives, dynamics of short-run 
equilibrium and changes in the long run.  Counterfeiting, as a market behavior, lasts as 
long as the pleasure from consuming and super profit from producing exist.  Section two 
analyzes six non-market factors behind the large-scale production in China. There are 
institutional, economic and social reasons that keep this illegal industry flourishing.  
Measures improving these factors should be effective to prevent a crackdown on the 
industry.  
Gentry et al. reveal that the difference between counterfeit and genuine articles 
did not appear to be dichotomous but a more continuous one that was made up of various 
levels, which include genuine, second, overall, legitimate copycat, high-quality and low-
quality counterfeits.1  Yet the price gap between the genuine and various counterfeits is 
truly deep, which has created and furnished a huge market both domestically and 
internationally.  For instance, an authentic DVD is sold on average at around 10 to 25 US 
dollars in US or European countries, while a pirated one only costs two or three dollars 
imported from China.  By all standards, China is now the world’s largest source of 
counterfeit goods.  The Chinese government is caught between combating the 
counterfeiters and coping with the unquenched market demand once in a while.  Now, not 
only most foreign brands like Pierre Cardin or Polo, but also Chinese local brands have 
been victims of fake goods production. Since the early 1980s, counterfeiting has reached 
a critical level, estimated as great as 15 – 20% of all brand products in China.2  A more 
conservative number from the China State Council in July 2004 estimated that the market 
value of counterfeit goods is at $19-24 billion annually.  Based on the $7 trillion worth of 
total retail sales of consumer goods in China, counterfeiting is a very sizable activity in 
the nation’s economy.  One estimate gauged the sales of counterfeits are estimated to be 
about $299 billion globally.3  Another source, the International Chamber of Commerce, 
estimated that counterfeit products account for 8% of world trade.4  Thus, counterfeiting 
has already become an overwhelming issue in China and also a significant focus in its 
international trade relationships.   
Although the scope and size of counterfeiting in China is unprecedented, 
historically, the economies of many countries, including the United States and Korea, 
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have encountered the similar issue at the certain stage of economic development.  In a 
market study, Gentry et al. conclude that while counterfeiting is a global phenomenon, 
though its presence is more common and more severe in some countries than others.5  
Why has this happened and why has it been existing so long?  What are the effective 
measures to both prevent and eliminate the fake goods?  This paper attempts to answer 
these questions from an economic perspective. 
One of the basic assumptions in applying economic theory is that market 
participants including consumers and producers are rational decision-makers. In other 
words, their sole objective is to maximize their welfare (utility for consumers or profit for 
producers) subject to the current resource or information constraints.  There are two 
distinct kinds of consumers in the counterfeit market.  The first type has the perfect 
information on the product and is willing to purchase the fakes to meet their needs at a 
desirable price range.  The decision is made after consumers balance their tastes, income 
and price.  The other type has imperfect information on the merchandise and is mostly a 
victim of commercial scam. Although both cases are of the same nature to producers, i.e. 
selling fakes, they affect consumers in a different way and have distinct consequences.  
The former is considered market equilibrium while the latter is more or less a market 
failure.  We thus will treat the two scenarios separately. 
Market Equilibrium 
1) Market demand 
By interviewing the informants, Gentry et al. found that under certain 
circumstances consumers are reaching for a specific brand and willing to compromise on 
the product.6  A counterfeit appears to offer consumers a chance to separate the brand 
from the product.  While the purchase of a counterfeit represents the consumption of the 
brand (brand decision), it does not appear to represent a "product" decision.  Belk also 
found that people in transition economies are willing to pay disproportionate parts of 
their income for symbolic Western products.7  Therefore, there is a reasonable market 
demand for counterfeits in less developed countries such as China, and even more 
advanced countries like the US (some street vendors have been caught selling 
counterfeits).  What determines this demand? First, counterfeits allow consumers to try a 
low-grade version with the intent of purchasing the authentic item if the trial is 
successful.  Second, counterfeits also appear to offer lesser value for lesser cost, which is 
an acceptable compromise and at times a desirable one given the initial outlay of 
expenditures required.  Thus, counterfeits are good as long as they are counterfeits of 
some brand.  Finally, the quality of counterfeits has improved greatly, especially as 
manufacturing technology has been out-sourced and new technology such as cheap, high 
quality color printers and copiers, and cheap CD burners and recording equipment have 
become more common.  The sophistication needed to discern quality counterfeits from 
authentic items has increased.  
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To be defined as equilibrium behavior, the counterfeit market must meet two 
conditions.  First, the transaction is voluntary and both parties are willing to exchange 
their possessions in pursuit of their mutual benefits.  The other is that the information is 
openly available, though releasing such information may have violated the intellectual 
property rights or other laws.  A consumer buys the fake goods if he or she thinks that 
cheaper but lower-quality counterfeit goods better meet his/her needs or buying 
characteristics than more expensive yet high-quality genuine ones.  Counterfeit goods 
provide consumers with good brand names at a competitive price, although their quality, 
contents and package may not be as good as the latter. For low-income individuals, 
counterfeit goods can be a good substitute for brand-new authentic ones.  Other possible 
substitutes include defective, returned, refurbished or unsold out-of-date merchandise, 
which are often seen in outlets in developed countries, but not so readily available in the 
less-developed countries.  In economics, income and preference are two of the most 
important determinants of demand.  In countries like China and India, some consumers 
have strong preferences for name brands such as Nike and Polo over cheaper, local 
names.  “Showoff” is more likely to yield a substantial amount of satisfaction among 
low-income communities.  Since their low income will not let them afford the genuine 
ones, buying fakes may be a good option for them at the expense of manufacturers of 
genuine goods. 
If the expenditure on counterfeit goods accounts for a fixed proportion of a 
consumer’s total budget, the demand for counterfeit goods will increase in the short run 
as income rises.  But in the long run, he or she will most likely switch to demanding 
genuine goods whenever the income reaches a certain level.  Therefore the price elasticity 
of demand for counterfeits decrease as income improves.  Given the current income, the 
demand for counterfeit goods increases as the price goes down.  This is described as the 
demand law in economics, i.e., a negative relationship between demand and price.  In 
Figure 1, the demand curve is plotted as DD with a negative slope, where the horizontal 
and vertical axes represent quantity and price respectively. 
2) Market supply 
On the other hand, there are many manufacturers supplying counterfeit goods.  
Their profits are the net difference between sales revenue and costs.  When the 
profitability of producing counterfeit goods is no lower than average returns from the 
general market, investors will move in, at the risks of possible loss and being caught by 
law enforcement.  Part of the counterfeit producers’ revenue is the super-profit from the 
similarity between the counterfeit and the genuine and marketing savings paid by the 
latter.  Counterfeit producers’ costs include both the transaction cost for production, 
management, transportation and selling, and the opportunity cost.  The opportunity cost is 
the additional cost that producers have to bear when producing counterfeit goods, 
including legal costs necessary to deal with possible prosecution by government, lawsuits 
filed by genuine producers, consumers and various other interest groups.  The legal cost 
can be very heavy, including being shut down, numerous monetary fines and jail time.  It 
also increases as one of the following conditions improve:  
 government improves the law enforcement;  
 consumers recognize the illegality of buying the fake goods;  
 the general public, legislature and law enforcement recognize property rights;  
 regional market is being united.  
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Many counterfeit goods markets are actually protected by the local government 
for the sake of tax revenues, which eventually cancel out the crackdown efforts led by the 
central government.  It is the high return in this industry that has made counterfeit goods 
production so motivated.  Only as the price increases sufficiently high will producers 
expand their production of counterfeit goods.  Therefore, the supply of counterfeit goods 
increases as the price goes up.  There is in general a positive relationship between supply 
and price, i.e., supply law.  In Figure 1, the supply curve is plotted as SS with a positive 
slope.   
 
3) Short-run equilibrium 
From Figure 1, consumers are willing to buy more counterfeit goods at lower 
prices while producers are willing to produce and sell more counterfeit goods at higher 
prices.  Lower price means bigger compensation for consumers to buy fake rather than 
genuine goods while high price means higher profit for producers to take the risks.  Their 
intersection defines market equilibrium, the position at which both consumers and 
producers are willing to trade.  In Figure 1, point E represents a combination of price P1 
and quantity Q1 that consumers and producers are willing to buy and sell counterfeit 
goods respectively. If the price is higher than P1, quantity demanded will be less than that 
supplied, and eventually oversupply will drive the price down.  If the price is lower than 
P1, quantity demanded will be more than that supplied, and eventually over-demand will 
drive the price up.    
4) Long-run equilibrium 
In the long run, both demand for and supply of counterfeit goods will shrink.  As 
economic capacity and income per capita improve, consumers’ preference will eventually 
switch to genuine goods.  At the same price level, consumers will demand less counterfeit 
goods and marginal rate of substitution of counterfeit goods for genuine ones will 
increase.  Consumers need more compensation or bigger price gap to compromise 
quality.  Therefore, the slope of the demand curve becomes sharper and at the same price 
level, the demand for counterfeit goods shrinks.  The new demand curve is plotted as 
DD’ in Figure 1.   
Given the shrinking demand, only the efficient producers can survive the market.  
If economic development also comes with the more effective legal system to protect 
innovation and property rights, production of counterfeit goods will become riskier and 
more costly.  To cover the cost, producers demand higher returns to survive in the line of 
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counterfeit goods.  In other words, producers’ marginal rate of transformation will be 
higher and the slope of supply curve then becomes sharper.  At the same price level, 
producers now are willing to produce less fake goods.  In Figure 1, the long-run supply 
curve is plotted as SS’. 
The new market equilibrium is the intersection point of new demand and new 
supply curves.  Compared to the short-run equilibrium point E, E’ represents a higher 
price level and a lower quantity sold.  
5) Effect on Genuine Goods 
Because some counterfeits appear to be an acceptable compromise and at times a 
desirable one given the limited budget, there is a substitution effect of counterfeits on 
genuine goods.  This effect is greater as the price gap between one particular brand and 
an average brand on the market deepens.  On Figure 2 below, the initial market demand 
and supply of a brand products without counterfeit factor are described by demand curve 
DD and supply curve SS.  The market equilibrium is reached at point E, which indicates 
that an ideal quantity of Q1 is supplied and demanded by the market participants at the 
desired price level P1.  There is neither an oversupply nor a shortage.  In an imperfect 
world, the possible counterfeiting activity is enticed by super profits from brand name, 
which will create a net substitution effect on the true brand products.  Low-income 
consumers can afford the brand name without paying the market price for the brand 
product, which they normally cannot afford.  High-income consumers are probably 
unaffected.  There is a possibility that the low-income consumers in the previous periods 
will be converted from counterfeit consumer to genuine goods consumer because of their 
preference for the brand name (even counterfeit) as their income improves.  This 
substitution effect diverges the demand curve for the brand from DD to DD’. The gap 
between the two curves deepens as the price rises.  The existing counterfeiting does not 
affect the supply of the brand products directly because the latter is a sole decision of 
genuine producers.  The new market equilibrium is reached at point E’ with a reduced 
quantity Q2 and price P2.  Eventually, the market demand for genuine brand product is 
reduced from Q1 to Q2 because of a negative substitution effect Q3-Q1 and a positive 
income effect Q3-Q2 due to reduced price.  Therefore, the counterfeiting is threatening 
the genuine brand products.         
 
Market Failure 
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Besides demand and supply driven by the “invisible hand”, there are many non-
market factors attributable to the widespread counterfeit goods sales in China.  Among 
them some of the most significant include: 
1) Asymmetric information. 
Information refers to everything relevant to consumers’ decision of spending. 
Perfect information is one of the assumptions to obtain market equilibrium defined as E 
or E’ in Figure 1.  On counterfeit goods market, producers and sellers know most 
attributes of the product while individual consumers have very little information about it.  
In many cases, the latter have no idea that they are not buying the authentic products.  
Even if they do, the difference between the fakes and genuine ones is largely unknown.  
The asymmetric information has a positive effect on the demand for counterfeits and thus 
shifts the DD curve to the right. 
It is generally the fact that producers are in the possession of more information on 
the product than buyers.  The issue in China lies in the lack of both legal and institutional 
measures to protect consumer interests.  Very little support is provided by government or 
few intermediate organizations are established to take consumers’ claims, maintain 
producers’ profiles or take legal action with systematic efforts.  Without enough 
knowledge on manufacturers’ prior history, the so-called bad-apples can easily walk 
away from punishment and continue to cheat next victim consumers.  In China, there is 
not a standard identification such as social security number for individuals or tax I.D for 
business.  Individuals or businesses selling counterfeit goods can move to another city 
with fresh faces after they finish their business in one city.  
2) Monopolistic industrial structure. 
China is still in the process of transition from a central planning economy to a 
market economy.  Both its political and economic systems are characterized by a 
monopolistic structure.  Until today, government imposes most of its influence on the 
economy by controlling fixed investment, which accounts for over 50% of Chinese GDP 
while its normal share in US is less than 20%.   Although the private sector has become 
more and more important in contributing to economic growth, governmental identities or 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) still dominate the allocation of most economic resources 
such as entry to key industries, bank loans, licenses for exporting and importing, inter-
provincial distribution, etc.  It is very difficult for a private business to obtain entry to 
many profitable industries and a large amount of excess private capital could thus be 
invested in counterfeit goods as a fair opportunity.  In reality, private businesses face 
much discrimination, for instance rent-seeking activities, in competition against SOEs so 
that normal profit from genuine goods production may not be sufficient to cover all costs.  
The difficulty to entry has a positive effect on the supply of counterfeits and thus shifts 
the SS curve to the right.  
3) Regionalism. 
Many counterfeit goods are partly covered and protected by local government 
while most of the crackdown efforts are from the central government.  Since the 
inception of reform in 1978, government officials are appointed and evaluated based on a 
complex package of measures.  The most important factor is their performance in terms 
of economic development, while others include social stability.  After the Chinese 
taxation system was divided into federal tax and local tax in 1994, local governments 
including those at province, district and county levels, are responsible for their own fiscal 
An Economics Analysis of Counterfeit Goods: the Case of China 
122    Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies  
health.  Political decision-makers at the regional or local levels are less motivated to 
crack down on the counterfeit goods industry especially if the genuine manufacturers 
being copied are not located in the same area.  The counterfeiting manufacturer is often 
an important source of revenue for a certain locality, thus the local governments naturally 
become the umbrella or shield of the infringing enterprises.  Some of the local 
government departments pull strings and seek help from powerful personages and go 
about drumming up support for the infringing enterprises.  The central authorities, such 
as the Administration of Industry and Commerce, when investigating and dealing with 
infringement cases, have met with considerable resistance from local government 
departments so that a number of persons directly responsible for the acts of infringement 
committed by enterprises have long remained at large. 
Zhu finds that local officials frequently come under great pressure to safeguard 
local economic interests and some have been known to form alliances with local 
counterfeiters.8  In some cases, local authorities may delay enforcement actions after a 
complaint is filed.  By the time law enforcement officials finally arrive at the suspect 
premises, the counterfeiter, offending goods, machinery, and equipment have all 
disappeared.  Some companies have reported that within the first half hour of lodging a 
complaint with local officials, the alleged counterfeiters can be seen moving products out 
of factories or warehouses.  Local officials have also been known to confiscate goods 
machinery, and equipment only to return these materials to counterfeiters once 
enforcement actions have been concluded.  Moreover, since local enforcement officials 
have broad discretion in determining the amount of fines and penalties and are not 
constrained by any mandatory minimum limits, some local enforcement entities impose 
light fines.  The regional protectionism has a positive effect on the supply of counterfeits 
and thus shifts the SS curve to the right. 
4) Ineffective legal system. 
Under the current Chinese intellectual property protection system, there are many 
laws applied to anti-counterfeiting.  However, none of the laws provide that contributory 
infringement is illegal.  It is clear that when manufacturers distributed their non-brand 
products to the warehouses or wholesalers, they definitely have knowledge that 
somebody or wholesalers will put the passing off marks on the products.  The 
manufacturers’ action constitutes contributory infringement.  Under such circumstance, 
the manufacturers will avoid being claimed guilty of infringement or any violation of the 
laws and no punishment could be imposed on them.  Another example is that the 
Customs Office who seize counterfeits and Chinese Trademark Office who records the 
genuine brand products do not establish any connection, which often makes it more 
difficult to provide proof of infringement.   
More importantly, the current Chinese institutional design is that administration, 
legislation and judicial systems are all tightly controlled by the Communist Party from 
the federal level down to the county level. Judges may serve the same purpose as 
administration officials, i.e., in developing the economy.  Lack of transparency, 
independence and knowledge in market economics often undermine the effectiveness of 
cracking down the fake goods industries and punishing illegal copiers.  The ineffective 
legal system has a positive effect on the supply of counterfeits and thus shifts the SS 
curve to the right. 
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5) Cheap labor.  
The cheap labor rate has been the most prominent factor in considering the China 
market.  Workers get paid $50 per month at an average factory on the east coast such as 
ZheJiang and GuangDong provinces, not even mention the less developed land 
provinces.  Cheap labor no doubt has been helping create the competitiveness of imports 
from the China market to the rest of the world, including imports of fake goods.  As 
mentioned earlier, substantial profit between selling price and production cost is the 
dominant market factor behind this overwhelming issue.  Extremely cheap labor in China 
can help explain why China, not other developing countries, has become the largest 
source of counterfeit goods in the world. The cheap labor makes it profitable to produce 
counterfeits and thus has a positive effect on the supply. 
6) Distribution 
It is not that the government does not want to interject into this issue; rather, it is 
the counterfeiter's guerilla distribution channels that make it impossible to track.   
Counterfeiters have set up probably the most cost efficient and deep distribution channel 
throughout China.  The DVD market in particular is a good example.  When they produce 
counterfeit products, manufacturers do not put any mark on the products.  Generally they 
have separate warehouses, a long distance from the factories, or they cooperate with 
wholesalers.  Manufacturers distribute the products to the warehouses or wholesalers 
without brand name, and in the warehouses or wholesalers’ warehouses, the 
counterfeiting marks are attached to the products.  Finally, wholesalers will put the 
passing off marks on the products before they are distributed to the market. 
Conclusions 
China is not the only country with counterfeits, but it is no doubt one of the 
regions most severely afflicted with the production and marketing of counterfeits.  The 
counterfeiting problem in China is complex.  Rational demand for brand names by low-
income consumers and super profits from producing counterfeit goods are incentives 
behind market equilibrium.  Except that, existence of counterfeit goods can also be 
attributable to the market failure factors, such as asymmetric information, externality of 
quality goods, market monopoly and incomplete law enforcement.  
The rational behavior of market participants will be ultimately adjusted by the 
changes in income, price, consumer preferences, and other market factors.  There is no 
easy solution to counterfeiting as an equilibrium.  However, counterfeiting as a result of 
market failure can be remedied by a comprehensive reform of relevant laws, intensified 
war against local protectionism, and consistent dedication from government leaders at all 
levels.  The effective measures to address the issue of inefficiency in the legal system 
include:  
 interpret clearly the legal terms under the Trademark Law Implementing Rules, 
and mandate imposition of the term of imprisonment and minimum fines against 
counterfeiters;  
 recover to the trademark owners enough compensations based on actual damages 
suffered, including investigation and legal expenses;  
 increase controls on domestic markets and export of counterfeit products in order 
to cut the distribution channels for counterfeit products;  
 enforce laws against government corruption and protectionism at all levels. 
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Therefore, the fight against counterfeiting has a long way to go.  Before then, 
however, counterfeits are going to exist on the market for some time.  
